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A persistent but difficult-to-articulate idea that we have of the cinema 
is that its relations to other artistic media are somehow special. For 
example, we know that since the cinema’s invention its technology and 
mass appeal have often led it to be regarded as uniquely deleterious 
to other media, and the theater in particular: a threat to the survival 
of older forms that has been, by different parties, both regretted and 
welcomed.1 But occasionally we also encounter commentators who, 
not always contesting the sociological or economic factors underlying 
the latter observations, nevertheless choose to frame the cinema’s rela-
tions to the other arts in terms of a special power for reconciliation 
or harmony, at least when in the right hands.
The contemporary Argentine director Matías Piñeiro gives us one 
variation on this idea. In a 2016 memorial tribute to the late French 
director Jacques Rivette (with whose films Piñeiro’s are frequently 
compared, typically for the importance that each gives to filming 
theater and theatrical rehearsals), Piñeiro characterizes Rivette’s 
1See Anton Kaes’s account of the different parties to the Kino-Debatte in Germany 
from 1909–1929 (“The Debate about Cinema”), as well as Eisenstein’s account of his 
earlier view that it was “absurd” for cinema and theater to continue coexisting (Film 
Form 191–92).
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works as having effected a kind of peaceful coexistence among 
various media: “Cultural hierarchy and snobbery evaporate in the 
face of power generated from these amicable duels between cinema 
and its neighboring arts.” Piñeiro adds, “In Rivette, there is no need 
to translate one art form into another; his films simply display one 
art exposed, naked and afraid, in front of another one, a moment of 
encounter captured in time and the energy of this complicity projected 
onto the screen” (“Deaths of Cinema”).
Here Piñeiro’s writing has several ambitions (including a comparison 
between Rivette and the defense by his Cahiers du Cinéma mentor 
André Bazin of film’s “impurity” with respect to other media: Bazin 
63–75), but it is close enough to presenting an image of Rivette’s 
medium as a special refuge from the problems that the other arts typi-
cally confront away from the cinema, such as problems about where 
one art ends and another begins, as well as about which art is higher 
and which is lower. Under Rivette’s camera, that is, “music, dance, 
painting, theatre” (as well as novels, as in the importance of Balzac’s 
History of the Thirteen to Rivette’s Out 1, 1971) could simply be, obviat-
ing the need for any further questions about medium specificity or 
hierarchy. On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that Piñeiro 
is offering a piece of criticism (however convincing) about what a 
specific talent like Rivette could achieve in film (and, moreover, what 
he could achieve by filming manifestations of the other arts), not an 
ontological claim about what film could do “automatically,” or simply 
in virtue of the medium it is.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, a version of the latter, stronger 
claim does appear in one of the most famous essays in English on 
modernism in the visual arts, and in terms that explicitly foreground 
cinema’s relationship to theater. Since its publication in Artforum in 
1967, Michael Fried’s “Art and Objecthood” has been known for its 
controversial claims about minimalist (or as Fried puts it, “literalist”) 
artists such as Donald Judd, Tony Smith, and Robert Morris. These 
include Fried’s claims about about how these artists’ works, in effect-
ing a “kind of stage presence” (Art and Objecthood 155, henceforth AO) 
constitute “a new genre of theater” (AO 153), and, through their reli-
ance on such “theatrical” effects, amount to the “negation of art” rather 
than a fulfillment of the principal task supposedly facing modernist 
artists: namely, to establish on new grounds (or to reconfigure) what 
had been convincing about, say, painting or sculpture of the past. 
And it is toward the end of these arguments that Fried offers his own 
version of the idea of the cinema as a refuge. For Fried, the task of 
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defeating theater, as well as the modernist task of re-constituting what 
had been convincing about past instances of a medium, simply have 
no application in film: or as he puts it, cinema is the “one art that, by 
its very nature, escapes theater entirely.” He adds, “Because cinema 
escapes theater—automatically, as it were—it provides a welcome and 
absorbing refuge to sensibilities at war with theater and theatricality.” 
And he concludes, “the automatic, guaranteed character of the refuge 
. . . means that the cinema, even at its most experimental, is not a 
modernist art” (AO 164).
Only in the last few years has this passage seemed to receive serious 
attention, and my sense that it shares a general image with Piñeiro’s 
description of Rivette—at least, of the cinema as a refuge from the 
questions about medium specificity and hierarchy that the other arts 
are thought to encounter—owes something to the themes explored 
by Daniel Morgan in a recent reflection on the fiftieth anniversary of 
“Art and Objecthood.” There Morgan expresses disagreement with 
Fried’s removal of cinema from the modernist problematic, while 
offering a compelling interpretation of Fried’s reasons for doing so, 
based on the philosopher Stanley Cavell’s understanding of cinema’s 
relationship to modernism in The World Viewed (a book explicit in 
many of its themes’ provenance in Cavell’s friendship with Fried; 
Morgan, “Missed Connections”). Morgan focuses on Fried’s additional 
statement that “movies in general, including frankly appalling ones, 
are acceptable to modernist sensibility whereas all but the most suc-
cessful painting, sculpture, music, and poetry is not” (AO 164); and 
he connects this with Cavell’s statements that, for at least most of 
cinema’s history, while other media have been unable to take their 
traditions for granted, the movies could convincingly draw on their 
prior conventions, rendering cinema “the one live traditional art” 
(The World Viewed 15, henceforth WV). (If this does not quite explain 
why even “appalling” films can be acceptable to modernist sensibil-
ity, it would at least explain why that sensibility allows itself a certain 
indiscriminateness with regard to film: WV 5–6, 13–14) Therefore, on 
Morgan’s interpretation of Fried, the “absorption” or “refuge” that 
cinema provides is not so much what those words might immediately 
suggest—cinema’s special capacity for kinesthetic bombardment, lull-
ing us into a kind of oblivion—but rather a refuge from the kinds of 
questions about its past that arise for other, modernist, media. And this 
emphasis on cinema’s “automatically” drawing on its past conventions, 
and the supposed guarantee of its audience’s absorption in doing so, 
also suggests an immediate response to Fried, developed by Morgan: 
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that the history of cinema itself—including the history of Hollywood, 
at least as far back as Griffith and DeMille—is in fact the history of 
self-conscious and critical evaluations of what came before (in that 
very medium).2
So far, then, we appear to have little reason to think that there is 
something in the “nature” or “ontology” of cinema to effect what 
Piñeiro says was Rivette’s specific achievement in filming the other 
arts. Nevertheless, when it comes to understanding Fried, there are 
still questions here, including about the extent to which his idea of 
cinema’s refuge from questions about its past conventions is facili-
tated by a picture of cinema as oblivion- or lull-inducing kinesthetic 
bombardment.3 And perhaps most importantly, before we can let go 
of Fried’s statement, there are still questions about why Fried needs 
to express cinema’s protection from modernist questions in terms of 
its escaping theater—beyond the obvious reason that “theater” is one 
of his principal terms of criticism for minimalist art. After all, we can 
take a case like Walter Benjamin, who in “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” is at least as concerned as 
Fried is about differences between cinema and theater (32, 35). But 
when it comes to the possibility of cinema’s automatically escaping 
the problems associated with an older medium in modern conditions, 
Benjamin devotes some of his most evocative passages to painting, 
and to how the cinema avoids the latter’s problems with providing 
“an object of simultaneous collective reception” (36; cf. Morgan, 
2In his brief but very illuminating remarks on Fried’s statement, Martin Shuster 
focuses on Fried’s notion of “objecthood,” as well as the Heideggerian notion of the 
“world” that he reads in The World Viewed. Shuster points out that, for Fried, when a 
work evades the modernist responsibilities of reconstituting past conventions on new 
grounds it is thereby removed from the world and its situating contexts: “uncertain, 
exactly incapable of bearing its presentation as a work of art” (36); and yet this is a 
problem that films can be seen to escape through their special capacity to project the 
world itself: “The screening of a film bars the possibility of ‘objecthood,’ for there 
is no object there, but only a screen, that is, a world” (38). Nevertheless, in the end 
Shuster also disagrees with the early Fried (he says, “the ontological qualities of film 
guarantee the possibility of worldhood, but they don’t guarantee a world”; 40; cf. Fried, 
Why Photography Matters 50), and his framing even allows us to imagine an expansion 
of Morgan’s objection: that just as film history is filled with attempts to reconstitute 
past conventions on new grounds, it is also filled with cases of failed, or “de-worlding,” 
orientations to the medium’s past. (Thus, it is not difficult to think of films that attempt 
to claim the powers of 1950s melodrama but without anything like the careful attention 
to that inheritance shown by, say, Fassbinder’s Ali, 1974.)
3In returning to this passage from “Art and Objecthood” over four decades later, 
Fried invokes the notion that a movie audience “loses itself” or “forgets itself.” (He 
is there connecting that passage to some characterizations of movie audiences by Jeff 
Wall: Why Photography Matters 12–13; cf. 371n33, Four Honest Outlaws 183.)
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“Modernist Investigations” 222, 225). Thus, although Fried insists 
that “there is no doubt but that a phenomenology of cinema that 
concentrated on the similarities and differences between it and stage 
drama—e.g. that in the movies the actors are not physically present 
. . . would be rewarding” (AO 171n20), we still await an understanding 
of how differences between theater and cinema might be relevant to 
Fried’s or anyone else’s sense (even if mistaken) that the cinema is 
protected from at least a certain range of self-conscious and critical 
questions—from which the theater is paradigmatically not protected.
The differences between theater and cinema that Fried points to, 
as well as the task of a “phenomenology of the cinema that concen-
trated” on these differences, will be recognizable to readers of The 
World Viewed, published by Cavell four years after Fried published 
“Art and Objecthood”; just as some of the features of theater Fried 
mentions will be recognizable to readers of Cavell’s earlier essays on 
Beckett’s Endgame and Shakespeare’s King Lear, which Fried indeed 
cites as influences on his essay (AO 172n23). My contention in the 
first part of this essay is that these writings by Cavell, taken together, 
constitute a worked-out vision, concentrated on these kinds of differ-
ences, of what it is for cinema to escape theater. To make this claim 
more tractable, I will focus on one difference between these media to 
which Cavell gives special attention: what he calls the “ontological fact” 
that “two screenings of the same film bear a relation to one another 
absolutely different from the relation borne to one another by two 
performances of the same play” (WV 229).4 I will consider how, even 
if the sense of cinema’s escaping theater (yielded by this difference 
between the two media) cannot validate Fried’s notion of cinema’s 
escaping modernism, we can nevertheless understand Cavell’s resulting 
picture of cinema (as projecting a world closed to human agency) as 
an especially vivid figure or symbol of what it would be to escape the 
modernist problematic, if such a thing were ever possible.
I think that this reading can cast a new light on recent develop-
ments that would otherwise seem to limit the contemporary interest 
of Fried’s original statement. On the one hand, Fried himself, who 
in recent years has been writing on film and video art from the per-
4Cavell adds: “I mean two performances of the same production of a play. This is the 
same fact as that a screening of a film is not a performance of it” (229). In discussing 
below the “fact of variability” in theater, I will focus on its restricted formulation (hav-
ing to do with variability among performances of the same production), though I will 
occasionally need to move between it and its unrestricted formulation (including vari-
ability among different productions of the same play), as both are relevant to theater’s 
peculiar way of requiring exercises of human agency at each moment.
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spective of notions of absorption and theatricality, has raised questions 
about his earlier talk of what cinema could do “automatically” (Four 
Honest Outlaws 182) and is no longer concerned to defend a strong 
claim about medium specificity as the source of artistic value (204).5 
But, on the reading proposed here, the original power of Fried’s 
statement consists precisely in the idea of the cinema as a symbol of 
relief from medium-specific worries.6 On the other hand, if our way 
into these views is Cavell’s writing on cinema’s escape from theater’s 
variability across performances, that entry would seem limited by the 
contemporary dominance of digital cinema, and the variability and 
interactivity that characterizes “new media” (Manovich 36–45). And yet 
it may be exactly under the pressure of questions about what cinema is 
in the “digital age” that we might turn for guidance to considerations 
of its relations to theater, especially if what results is, again, a symbol 
of relief from those sorts of worries. In the second part of this essay 
I will argue that something like the latter thought is central to the 
recent Shakespeare-inspired films of Matías Piñeiro, whose proximity 
to Fried’s concerns (in his writing on Rivette) I have already noted. By 
focusing on Viola (2012), a digitally photographed film drawing on a 
medley of Shakespeare plays that Piñeiro had previously arranged and 
directed, I will show how these interrelations between media inform 
Piñeiro’s rendering of his characters’ (romantic, erotic, economic) 
interrelations; and how the result is that this figure—of cinema as 
escape from the questions urged by theater—itself becomes a way of 
making sense, or going on, within film.
Part 1. Cavell and Fried on Cinema’s Escaping Theater
1.1. If we want to understand why the relations between cinema and 
theater should figure importantly in Cavell and Fried’s conceptions of 
modernism, it might make sense to work somewhat backwards: that is, 
from Cavell’s remarks at the end of the second edition of The World 
Viewed on the difference in the relations between two screenings of 
the same film and two performances of the same play. (That Cavell 
5Nevertheless, Fried says that “the basic idea [in his original statement about cinema] 
still seems to me right” (Four Honest Outlaws 182; see also Why Photography Matters 13). 
Diarmuid Costello has argued that the early Fried’s views on medium specificity were in 
any case in tension with his anti-essentialist views on modernism (“On the Very Idea”).
6I have not had the opportunity to bring into consideration a similar reading by 
Kathleen Kelley, which appeared just before this essay went to print. But I recommend 
her account of the “partial collapse of the stakes of medium specificity” in Cavell and 
Fried (61).
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brings the book to a close with these “ontological remarks” suggests 
something of their importance for him.7) The immediate context is 
Jean Renoir’s treatment of the theater in The Rules of the Game (1939): 
remarking on that film’s “pervasive theme of ‘accident,’” Cavell says 
that “In a theater, the actors appear in person; it is part of the latent 
anxiety of theater that anything can happen to break the spell—a 
cue missed, a line blown, a technical hitch. The abyss between actor 
and audience is not bottomless, unless convention is bottomless.” In 
contrast, in the cinema, “the actors are not present in person and 
the screen is metaphysically unreachable; the abyss between actor 
and audience is as bottomless as time.” The cinema does not thereby 
exclude accidents, but rather, in its nature as an automatic medium, 
“everything caught by film is accident, contingency. Then one must 
equally say that every accident on film becomes permanent . . . .” (229).
These closing remarks indeed rehearse claims made in the chapters 
constituting the first edition of The World Viewed, such as about how 
a filmmaker, in finishing a work, “releases it to multiply itself” (122); 
and about how in the theater it is by convention that we are said not 
to share the same space as the performers; whereas, when it comes 
to film, it is only by accident of time and place (rather than by law of 
convention) that we were not ourselves caught by the camera (155). 
Each of these claims of course needs further elaboration. First, we 
need to recognize that we do tolerate a degree of variability between 
prints, copies, and projections derived from the same source film: 
scratches, hairs, mechanical interruptions, and more recently glitches, 
as well as variations across video and streaming formats.8 Moreover, 
we need to take into account that theatrical conventions do not in 
fact render unbreachable the division between actors and audience, 
that not every communication between these spaces is an interrup-
tion, and that part of the variability across performances that these 
conventions must tolerate include those affected by changes in the 
audience’s palpable mood, or a look or gesture that a spectator gives 
to a performer.
7Similar ontological remarks on this difference between film and theater appear 
in two essays written by Cavell in the years following “More of The World Viewed” (the 
1974 essay reprinted in the book’s second edition and containing the discussion of 
Renoir): “On Makavejev on Bergman” (Themes Out of School 109–110) and “Cons and 
Pros: The Lady Eve” (Pursuits of Happiness 52). It is a theme he very briefly returns to 
three decades later in Cities of Words (402–3).
8For a highly convincing account of the aesthetic interest of such variations in 
“noise” across projections, see Frank, Frame by Frame 44–73. Accounts of the variability 
involved in digital reproducibility, particularly image compression, include Manovich 
54–55 and Steyerl.
1290 BYRON DAVIES
What Cavell is ultimately getting at is that performance, in requir-
ing exercises of human agency at every moment, thereby invites that 
variability (across performances) that is internal to human agency; 
whereas film, when it automatically captures and then reproduces 
exercises of human agency, afterwards tolerates only those accidents 
(scratches, glitches) internal to the automatic mechanism itself. As 
I alluded to earlier, this is a concern that Cavell shares with Walter 
Benjamin (32; Pursuits of Happiness 266–68). But not every writer on 
these topics has been impressed by the difference between film and 
theater that Cavell emphasizes.9 For example, in her essay “Film and 
Theatre,” Susan Sontag says, “With respect to any single experience, it 
hardly matters that a film is usually identical from one projection of 
it to another while theatre performances are highly mutable” (Son-
tag 31). Nevertheless, the actualism or internalism informing Sontag’s 
emphasis on the “single experience” would be difficult to sustain. 
This is not only because it would appear to exclude as aesthetically 
significant a well-known play’s attempts to draw on associations with 
past performances of it (perhaps the most common way in which 
theater calls attention to the fact of variability),10 but also because 
it would appear to exclude what Cavell calls the “latent anxiety of 
theater”: that, with each performance, there is no telling how things 
might not go according to plan. That is, that things might have gone 
otherwise (relative to other manifestations of the work) is essential 
to the “single experience” of a play in a way that it is not for a single 
experience of a film.11
What I am calling the fact of variability can also present a set of 
problems in theater. Some of these connect to the themes of “The 
9Noël Carroll is onto much the same phenomena when he notes that “even if theat-
rical performances and film performances may both be said to be tokens, the tokens 
in the theatrical case are generated by interpretations, whereas the tokens in the film 
case are generated by templates” (67). But though Carroll thinks this difference reveals 
a necessary condition for being a “moving image” (in his sense), his remarks on its 
aesthetic significance are mostly limited to the observation that, therefore, the screen-
ing of a film (unlike the performance of a play) is not of itself an “artistic event” (70).
10Sontag’s statement is ambiguous between what I above called the restricted and 
unrestricted formulations of the fact of variability in theater.
11Of course, what films can do is generate anxiety through the projection of those 
scenarios in the theater that contribute to that medium’s “latent anxiety” (just as they 
can generate anxiety and suspense about whether any projected exercise of human 
agency will “succeed,” by whatever terms are of interest). And, as even repeated viewings 
of Cassavetes’s Opening Night (1977) demonstrate, this can involve not just the anxiety 
(familiar from backstage dramas) about whether the show will come off, but also a 
complex range of emotions centered on the improvisations that result when things 
do not go according to plan; the uncertainties over what is scripted and what is the 
unplanned irruption of a performer’s own pathos; as well as the varying communica-
tions of emotion between audience and performer (Carney 261–62).
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Avoidance of Love” (Cavell’s essay on King Lear), and include the 
way in which the bare possibility of things having gone otherwise 
(relative to other manifestations of the play) can give rise to a kind 
of skepticism, or a distancing from the proceedings on the stage. For 
example, while watching a performance of Lear, a sense of who Lear 
is might elude us, insofar as we are inclined to keep in mind that 
(apart from his thousands of past incarnations) Lear has manifested 
himself in this body several times this week, each time with slightly 
different emphases and inflections (and seeming to respond to varying 
moods among the audience). Perhaps we have even been present for 
more than one of those incarnations in this same space, and after a 
systematic accounting of such differences between performances we 
might be inclined to say that they cancel each other out, and that all 
Lear could ever be is a role. But then we have reached the difficulty 
of understanding how a mere role—thinking of something like third 
base, or public defender—could ever be anything other than an 
institutional fact to be navigated around, let alone how a mere role 
(as opposed to the person occupying it) could ever make a claim on 
our powers of identification.12
1.2. At a memorable point in “The Avoidance of Love” Cavell 
remarks on our anxiety about what we could possibly say to someone 
who did not understand the procedures of theater (who would, for 
example, run up to try to save Desdemona from Othello; Must We 
Mean What We Say? 326–31, henceforth MWM). And a related anxiety 
concerns what we could say to someone who, understanding those 
procedures perfectly well, nevertheless manages (say, through obsessive 
concentration on the fact of variability) to think themselves out of a 
significant relation, or identification, with the characters presented 
before them. Of course, it is often the mark of a successful or mov-
ing performance to put such thoughts, including about the fact of 
variability, out of mind, and to draw us into the immediate proceed-
ings. But Cavell’s essay’s emphasis on the theater as a potential site 
for avoiding acknowledgment reminds us that it could just as well be a 
response to a moving performance—for example, to the difficulties of 
seeing Lear’s shame incarnated before us—to want to take refuge in 
these thoughts’ occluding effects. The fact of variability is something 
that we, as uneasy spectators, can hide behind.
Also, it is consistent with these observations that for much of its 
history western theater could rely, not just on drawing the audience 
12Or our powers of “engagement,” to use Murray Smith’s more encompassing term 
(Engaging Characters). Similar questions about repeated instances of a theater actor’s 
performance arise in Raúl Ruiz’s Poetics of Cinema 65–8.
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into the immediate proceedings, but also on the audience’s willing-
ness to suspend disbelief arising from the fact that the proceedings 
are just one among many, each inevitably different: and this may 
indeed be what Sontag is depending on in saying that the fact of vari-
ability makes no difference to the “single experience” of a play. But 
it is characteristic of modernist conditions (as both Cavell and Fried 
understand them) that what was once taken for granted in traditional 
manifestations of a medium must continuously be re-earned: and, 
if modernist theater finds that it cannot, without dishonesty or bad 
faith, re-earn the conviction (say, around ignoring or suppressing the 
fact of variability) it had previously enjoyed, that too must be made 
explicit (“acknowledged”) in the play or performance. Thus, in his 
reading of Beckett’s Endgame, Cavell responds to Beckett’s making 
explicit that the proceedings before us are just one among many, that 
“Over and over we are shown that everything that is happening has 
happened before” (MWM 148); and that this is central to the play’s 
deliberate rendering of Hamm, Clov, Nagg, and Nell as abstractions or 
mere roles, as “no more characters than cubist portraits are particular 
people” (MWM 131).13 Another example is Brecht, who was impressed 
by the special possibilities supposedly available in Chinese theater to 
shock audiences through unexpected variations within gestures fixed 
over generations (in contrast with the easy acceptance of variability 
he found in western theater; Brecht 175). And he too can be under-
stood as aiming to shock his audiences through his open declaration 
of the fact of variability—through dispelling any illusions that the 
performance is but one among many—together with the other forms 
of explicitness that Cavell, in discussing Brecht, describes as “wedging 
the mutual consciousness of actor and audience between the actor 
and his character” (WV 111).
I have brought up these problems arising for the fact of variability 
in theater—that concentration on it can effect a distance between 
audience and character, a distancing that some modernist theater 
openly declares—partly because they touch on some of the charac-
terizations of theater central to “Art and Objecthood,” such as Fried’s 
understanding of minimalist art as theatricalizing both in the effects of 
its repetitions and in the distance it creates between work and beholder 
13I do not think this is always correct as a characterization of cubist portraits—Pi-
casso’s portrait of Ambroise Vollard (1910) is highly individualizing—but Cavell’s point 
is perfectly clear.
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(157, 166).14 In addition, I have brought up these problems because 
they allow for an immediate understanding of how cinema, in escap-
ing the fact of variability, also escapes these problems (at least in not 
having these problems forced on it, as can a play), and therefore, in 
its character as an automatic medium, escapes a certain sense of the-
ater. Even when there exist multiple cuts of the same film (whether 
or not they enjoy the same degree of authorization by the director), 
each cut, once finished, settles with relative decisiveness questions 
about its future projections—a power that no finished manifestation 
of a play has over its future performances. Therefore, a cut of a film 
“escapes theater” at least to the extent that it is in that way singular 
or invariable. (The comparative indeterminacy that results across 
variations in theatrical performances also helps to locate what in the 
actual practice of theater might inform Fried’s associating the latter 
with “inexhaustibility” and “resistance to closure”: AO 45, 165–67; cf. 
Another Light 264–65.15)
It is best understood as an extension of these points about the 
differences between film and theater, not as a reconsideration of 
them, that Cavell (also toward the end of his reading of The Rules of 
the Game) imagines a possible change in practice, saying, “A theater 
director might invite audiences only to ‘rehearsals’; a movie director 
might insist upon showing only ‘rushes’” (WV 229). That is, calling 
performances “rehearsals” would not eliminate the fact of variability 
in theater, but would on the contrary explicitly declare it. And while 
only showing “rushes” might expose audiences to multiple takes, 
someone (or something) would nevertheless need to select what is 
shown at those rushes (even if the selection is indiscriminate); there-
fore—despite the tentative spirit of the presentation—the normal 
relation between takes and public screening would remain.
Nevertheless, what is nearly always partial or variable across multiple 
screenings are our subjective relations to the same film: “one is always 
a different spectator,” as Jacques Rivette put it (Rosenbaum, Sedofsky, 
and Adair). Sometimes, as Berys Gaut notes, this can be the effect of 
14On these distancing effects, see Melville (61). Note that the early Fried’s medium-
specific understanding of the sources of “quality and value” in the individual arts would 
help explain why he is opposed to the distancing effects of minimalist works (in the 
plastic arts) but seemingly quite open to those effects in the theater itself (particularly 
as practiced by Brecht and Artaud) (AO 163, 164, 171n19, 172n23).
15See also Annette Michelson’s response to these passages by Fried (15–17), and her 
implicit extension of Fried’s talk of modernist works as “wholly manifest” (AO 167), in 
contrast with theater’s “inexhaustibility,” to the “New Dance” of Merce Cunningham 
and Yvonne Rainer, among others (35–37).
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viewers’ coming to appreciate how their attention was manipulated 
on an earlier screening (251). And recently George M. Wilson, in 
describing a viewer’s possibly varying experience of the emotions 
expressed in a closeup of Octave across multiple screenings of The 
Rules of the Game, goes as far as saying that “there has been a change 
in the ‘core’ content of what the viewer has imagined seeing from 
one showing to another. The very look of Octave’s face, as the viewer 
imagines it each time, has changed” (Seeing Fictions in Film 158). But 
even a formulation as strong as Wilson’s presupposes the conception of 
a film as itself escaping variability that I think is Cavell’s fundamental 
concern: in order for us to speak at all about my “imagining seeing” 
different contents in a closeup of Octave, we must suppose that it is 
indeed the same closeup (allowing for questions about how we count 
such things across different prints and physical supports). And in fact 
these observations allow us to render more precise the way in which 
films can escape the problems associated with the imposition of vari-
ability (across performances) in theater. It could never have been that 
our subjective relations to a film were invariable, but rather that it is 
available to the medium to escape the compounding of problems in 
those relations (thinking of the “abstracting” or “distancing” effects I 
described across multiple performances of King Lear) when the object 
to which we are related is not something singular, to which we can 
return, but (as in multiple performance of the same play) itself variable.
1.3. These ways in which film escapes the fact of variability are 
related to two further contrasts between film and theater to which 
Cavell devotes his attention. The first is Erwin Panofsky’s point, which 
Cavell expands on, that whereas the characters in a play can be said to 
enjoy an existence prior to any particular performance, “The character 
in a film . . . lives and dies with the actor. It is not the entity ‘Othello’ 
interpreted by Robeson or the entity ‘Nora’ interpreted by Duse, it 
is the entity ‘Greta Garbo’ incarnate in a figure called Anna Christie 
. . . .” (Panofsky 28, quoted in WV 27). Of course franchises and literary 
adaptations complicate the sense in which a film character “lives and 
dies with the actor,” and Cavell later puts the point more delicately 
by saying that “the distinction between actor and character is broken 
up on the screen” (WV 175; cf. Benjamin 31). But it is notable that 
we already touched on the contrasting separability of actor and char-
acter in the theater when considering how attention to the fact of 
variability can invite attention to the transpersonal and trans-temporal 
role rather than its particular manifestation. In contrast, film typically 
escapes that consequence, and to that extent “escapes theater,” insofar 
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as it is specially capable of giving priority to a particular manifesta-
tion of a role (or set of such manifestations); and it can do this not 
only through the camera’s special capacity to capture the expressions 
(including non-voluntary expressions) of particular human beings, 
but also through the medium’s special capacity to reproduce those 
expressions indefinitely.16 Thus, even when the camera may have 
captured an actor’s deliberate fulfilling of a role, none of the future 
projections available (unlike future performances of a play) depend 
on a further such role-fulfillment.
Second, Cavell typically associates theater with the temporal present 
and film (as well as photography more generally) with the temporal 
past (WV 23, 25–26, 210–11, 214). These associations have little or 
no bearing on either medium’s capacity to represent certain time 
periods, whether past, present, or future. (History and science fiction 
are available to both media, even if they might mean different things 
in each.) Rather, the sense in which a play’s tense must be present 
concerns the fact that we, as spectators, are “present . . . at what is 
happening” (MWM 338): the performance could not be happening 
unless human agents kept it going, and this includes not only the 
performers but also the spectators, on whom the play depends at 
least in the negative sense of their not breaking the conventions by, 
say, crossing over the footlights. In contrast, Cavell says, “In viewing 
a movie my helplessness is mechanically assured: I am present not at 
something happening, which I must confirm, but at something that 
has happened, which I absorb (like a memory)” (WV 26). Pointing out 
that a film’s proceedings are already settled or determined before its 
projection (even if just before or in the course of projection, as with 
experiments in live editing) is in essence just another way of saying 
that film escapes the fact of variability. And this is notable because 
it allows us to see how cinema’s escaping theater is not just a matter 
of its escaping certain problems and questions typical of theater, but 
is also a matter of its expanding our powers of expression, allowing 
for a distinctive sense of pastness typically unavailable in the theater.
16This sort of idea, that in the theater actors’ non-voluntary expressions do not have 
the same meaning as when they are captured and reproduced by the camera—cen-
tered on the fact that a theater actor must project themselves into a role, rather than 
be projected—may be something that Cavell develops from his reading of Bazin’s 
two-part essay “Theater and Cinema,” cited twice in The World Viewed: 232n7, 233n15. 
It particularly seems to lie behind Bazin’s statement that “There is no such thing as a 
‘slice of life’ in the theater” (Bazin 89). For discussion of themes related to the camera’s 
ability to capture an individual’s non-voluntary expressions, see Moran, Philosophical 
Imagination 88–100; as well as Cavell, Cities of Words 198–207 and Cavell on Film 115–33.
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Cavell’s conception of cinema’s temporality is not always easy to 
countenance, especially when approached from the perspective of writ-
ers (like Christian Metz) who think that cinema’s essential difference 
from still photography lies in its communication of present movement 
(Metz 3–15).17 But the contrast with theater helps to bring out Cavell’s 
core thought, something effectively illustrated in the closing scene of 
the film that I will discuss at length in the second part of this essay, 
Matías Piñeiro’s 2012 film Viola.18 Toward the end of Piñeiro’s film, 
a scene between the titular character and her boyfriend Javier leads 
into Viola’s offscreen narration of the subsequent decline in their rela-
tionship, something facilitated (she tells us) by her later introducing 
Javier to Cecilia, the same theater actress with whom we had earlier 
seen him exchanging glances from a theater audience, affecting her 
performance in a medley of Shakespeare plays. The fact that this is 
the only such narration in the film and that it appears just before the 
closing credits has the effect of rendering the events of the film irre-
trievably past or lost (at least from the perspective of Viola, who now 
emerges as potentially the narrator, or fantasizer, of even those scenes 
in which she did not appear), as well as of imbuing her singing a silly 
song with Javier over the closing credits with a melancholy it would not 
otherwise have. It is crucial to the interest of this effect (especially in 
the context of Piñeiro’s film) that reproducing it in the theater would 
face peculiar challenges, and not just because the same actor cannot 
be at once on stage and off stage (which might be remedied through 
an audio recording). Rather, any intended effect of such irretrievable 
pastness or lostness in the theater would be in tension with the fact 
that something must still be happening among the actors in front of 
us—they must be actively keeping the proceedings going—in order 
for there to be any effect on the stage at all. Of course, theater has 
its own ways of rendering significant that our helplessness before the 
proceedings is assured by the conventions of theater (something whose 
importance for the performance of tragedy Cavell develops in “The 
Avoidance of Love”; MWM 337–44). But a major aspect of cinema’s 
escaping theater may be its special capacity (which Piñeiro exploits) 
to escape theater’s absolute dependence on “what is happening” (thus 
17In Camera Lucida Barthes also emphasizes differences in the temporalities of cinema 
and still photography (55, 89–90), though his views on cinema’s ability to communicate 
a “melancholic” pastness are more equivocal (79). For more on temporality in The World 
Viewed, including the contrast with theater’s temporality and Cavell’s difference from 
Metz, see Morgan, “Modernist Investigations” 223, 229–32, 239.
18My sense of the importance of this closing scene owes much to Aaron Garrett’s 
writing about Viola (“A Cinematic Epilogue’s the Thing”).
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accounting for the fact of variability) and to declare the film’s events 
lost or closed even while we are watching them.
1.4. Part of what is attractive about interpreting Cavell as thinking 
that an escape from the problems of variability in theater figures as 
a characteristic option for film is that it allows that filmmakers might 
only partially take that option (though doing so might not result 
in “movies” in Cavell’s sense: WV 103). This would then allow for 
the full spectrum of mixtures of performance and projection (and 
introductions of variability across projections) that, though they were 
never among Cavell’s specific concerns, were already flourishing in 
art spaces by the time he published The World Viewed.19 In addition, 
we find that even narrative films can choose to introduce their own 
kinds of variability (between repeated components of the film, as 
opposed to between projections). This includes repeating scenes with 
variations (not always declaring whether any version is more “real” or 
privileged, or whether those different versions can be resolved into 
different characters’ perspectives or fantasies) in order communicate 
something about chance or hypothesis, as in certain films by Hong 
Sang-soo (The Day He Arrives, 2011; Right Now, Wrong, Then, 2015) 
and in Piñeiro’s The Princess of France (2014, the film following Viola 
in his series of Shakespeare films). It can also include efforts to make 
explicit a narrative film’s typical dependence on multiple takes of the 
same scene (before it is completed), as in the two takes of Kate and 
Norman Mailer at the opening of Godard’s King Lear (1987).
Sometimes these repetitions-with-variations can be understood as 
communicating the effect of a narrator’s or an “implied filmmaker’s” 
revisions (cf. Wilson, Narration in Light 126–44), but they can also be 
understood as having the equally self-reflexive, modernist ambition 
of relating the medium of cinema to phenomena associated with 
theater, or of experimenting with what it is to put those phenomena 
on film. For example, in Rivette’s Céline and Julie Go Boating (1974) 
repetitions-with-variations characterize each presentation of the “film-
within-the-film” (often referred to as Phantom Ladies over Paris) that 
by magic Céline (Juliet Berto) and Julie (Dominique Labourier) 
alternately enter into, swapping the very same role. And just as that 
19In Expanded Cinema (published in 1970, the year before the first edition of The World 
Viewed) Gene Youngblood says that in “real-time multiple projection, cinema becomes 
a performing art” (387). Also in roughly that same period introductions of variability 
across projections were understood to play a role in militant political organizing: in 
their important 1969 manifesto “Towards a Third Cinema,” Fernando Solanas and 
Octavio Getino say of their revolutionary film acts that across projections “the possibility 
of introducing variations, additions, and changes is unlimited” (249).
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“inner” film gradually comes to take on further aspects of theater 
(including curtain calls and the applause of an unseen audience), by 
the time we arrive at Rivette’s film’s closing shots (and their renewal 
of the film’s opening shots, with Céline and Julie swapping roles yet 
again) such repetitions-with-variations have come to bleed into the 
“outer” film as well. In that way, aspects of theater, particularly those 
connected with variability across performances, are shown to determine 
global features of the film’s narration. (Another factor is the extent 
to which that narration can be understood as determined by Céline 
and Julie’s shared games of make-believe, a notion whose significance 
for Cavell I will soon return to.)20
Therefore, once we focus on Fried’s notion of cinema’s escaping 
theater, we have (thanks to Cavell), a convincing idea of what that 
would mean, centered on cinema’s option for escaping the fact of 
variability, but one that appears quite unmoored from Fried’s idea of 
cinema’s escaping modernism. And, to raise an additional worry for 
the early Fried, this is an idea that, through particular filmmakers’ 
acknowledgment of just those relations with theater, appears to make 
possible a distinctive kind of modernist cinema (even just within the 
category of traditionally projected narrative films).21 Or rather: our 
focus on cinema’s option for escaping the fact of variability validates 
no stronger version of Fried’s claim than the idea that cinema, to 
the extent it takes that option, escapes those terms of criticism that 
he and Cavell think apply to works in modernist conditions (a sus-
picion of fraudulence, a condemnation to either absolute success or 
absolute failure; cf. MWM 188–93; WV 13, 97) insofar as those terms 
apply to theater’s ways of dealing with the fact of variability. In any 
case, though, saying that cinema can escape those terms of criticism as 
they apply to variability in theater (even while some films might seek 
their own kinds of variability) would be only slightly more substantial 
than saying that painting can escape modernism to the extent that it 
20An excellent summary of Céline and Julie’s play with traditional theatrical forms is 
Wiles 98–111.
21More recently Fried has said that, in making such statements, he is “referring 
basically to Hollywood movies of the classic sort” (Four Honest Outlaws 183). But aside 
from Morgan’s objection that it is historically inaccurate to characterize even classic 
Hollywood films as siloed off from modernest self-questioning, it is hard to see what 
aesthetically relevant criteria Fried could appeal to (in setting apart Hollywood films) 
that do not beg the very question (e.g. his appeal to Hollywood movies’ “transparency”; 
183). Fried additionally mentions the viewer’s being “immersed” in a movie’s “world” 
(182), but this is also a frequently noted feature of Rivette’s films, with their long, im-
mersive running times; indeed it is the very feature thematized in Céline and Julie’s 
immersion in the world of Phantom Ladies over Paris.
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escapes, say, the problems arising for tonality and atonality in music. 
(I say “only slightly more substantial” because certain overlaps between 
cinema and theater as performance-based dramatic arts should allow 
for contexts—for example, the question of whether to adapt a story 
as a film or a play—in which that “escape” could be of genuine inter-
est, though this is still a very limited sense of “escaping modernism.”)
1.5. But is that really all there is to say about the relation between 
cinema’s escaping the fact of variability and the idea of an escape from 
modernism? And if so, are we then forced back into thinking that the 
motivating image in Fried’s statement of the cinema as a refuge is indeed 
something like that of a site of oblivion-inducing kinesthetic bombard-
ment, as opposed to any of the more elaborate ideas we have found 
in Cavell? Yet it is here that Cavell’s association between cinema and 
the past—his idea that in the cinema, in contrast with the theater, we 
are present at “what has happened”—can be particularly illuminating. 
Again, for Cavell, our helplessness before the proceedings of a film is 
“mechanically assured”: its proceedings are already closed or finished 
even while we are watching them unfold; the mechanism will ensure 
(to the degree that it can) that they will unfold the exact same way 
each time; and they require no more exercise of agency from specta-
tors (unlike theater, and its required participation in conventions) 
than is required to operate the mechanism. We know that a medium 
with that power would not escape modernist conditions; but it would 
provide us with a symbol of what it would be to escape those condi-
tions, if that were ever possible. That is, it would provide a contrast 
with circumstances in which the questions and problems of art are 
never perfectly closed, because we must raise them again and again 
with each new work, or with each new attempt to mean something.22
Once put this way, we can better understand Cavell’s concern with 
other respects in which cinema, in contrast with theater, manifests a 
limit on (or rather, relief or escape for) the audience’s agency. These 
include points touching on the relative importance in these media 
of make-believe (a notion that has since come to have even greater 
importance in philosophical accounts of audiences’ relations to fic-
tions, as a result of Kendall Walton’s work: see Mimesis as Make-Believe) 
and of the mutual complicity between audience and performers that 
22That Cavell is willing to contemplate the bare possibility (even if utopian) of escap-
ing those conditions is suggested by his way of closing the “excursus” on modernist 
painting in The World Viewed with two quotations from Thoreau’s Walden: “Who knows 
what the human body would expand and flow out to under a more genial heaven?” 
“Who knows what sort of life would result if we had attained to purity?” (118).
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can characterize theater. A seemingly incidental example appears in 
the second edition of The World Viewed, when Cavell notes that “On 
the stage, two trees may constitute a forest, and two brooms the two 
trees; for the screen, this would yield only two brooms,” as well as 
related contrasts involving all the different meanings that in theater 
could be made of what in cinema is but “an empty stage with a couple 
of platforms on it” (WV 199). (In addition Cavell notes how these 
phenomena might be declared in theater, though we can also see 
it declared in modernist and postmodernist films by, say, Derek Jar-
man, Mark Rappaport, and Andrew Horn, whose “theatricality” partly 
consists in the understanding that their austere sets will, on film, be 
seen exactly as sets.)
The local context for these remarks is Cavell’s defense of the 
ontological importance of “reality” to film (or of the illusion of real-
ity manifested in a film’s special effects) through a contrast with the 
ontological importance of “convention” to theater. And yet these 
remarks also seem informed by a further sense (related to cinema’s 
escape from variability in theater, and its projecting a world “past”) 
of how a film is closed to the viewer’s agency. That is, the projection 
of a film has its meaning (if we just focus on what would figure in 
a strict factual account of its proceedings) anyway, independently of 
anything like the mutual complicity, or games of make-believe, between 
performers and audience that can appear to be all that sustains at least 
certain performances.23 (And what is more, outside of those games and 
specific settings, it is not the sort of meaning—again, on screen, two 
brooms are left to be just two brooms—that it is normally within the 
power of film audiences to play a role in making.24) This, then, would 
be yet another place where Cavell’s attention to theater, in contrast 
with cinema, might retrospectively clarify what in the actual practice of 
theater informs Fried’s use of “theater” as a term of criticism: namely 
23Metz has a somewhat similar conception of theater (as what “can only be a freely 
accepted game played among accomplices”; 9–10), though we can imagine Cavell in-
terrogating the commensurability between the two media that seems presupposed by 
Metz’s resulting distinction between theater’s “weak” and cinema’s “strong” impressions 
of reality (10; cf. WV 73), as well as, again, Metz’s suggestion that the latter excludes 
an impression of pastness.
24Unless, as it happens, they themselves appear in the film or played a role in its 
production (prior to the screening). Obviously theatrical conventions and make-believe 
can have their effects on screenings, as when (within specific settings) they can render 
even screens and rear (or front) projections as extensions of the stage; this then ac-
counts for further interesting iterations on the phenomena around filming sets that I 
mention above, such as the “theatrical” use of rear (or front) projection in Rappaport’s 
and Horn’s films, as well as in Syberberg’s Hitler (1977) and in Straub and Huillet’s 
Chronicle of Anna Magdalena Bach (1968).
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(as in the sentences immediately preceding Fried’s statement about 
cinema) theater’s being dependent on, or “incomplete,” without a 
beholder (AO 163–64). And this also begins to address the earlier 
question of why cinema and theater (rather than, for example—as is 
sometimes the case for Walter Benjamin—cinema and painting) should 
constitute our two axes for understanding modernism in the arts. 
Cinema (and perhaps also still photography, though the notion of an 
“audience” does not traditionally have the same purchase in the latter 
as it does in former) figures for us as the paradigm of an art marked 
by automatic limits on our games of collaborative meaning-making, 
whereas theater is our paradigm of an art that might be sustained by 
nothing but those games.
What remains, then, is to connect that image of theater as collabora-
tive meaning-making (between audience and performer) to a concep-
tion of modernism. But such an idea is not unusual. For example, we 
find it in a 1975 essay by Jonathan Rosenbaum, originally published 
in Sight and Sound, on the improvisatory qualities of Robert Altman’s 
films to that date (and in which, incidentally, Rivette’s contemporary 
experiments are an important point of comparison). There Rosenbaum 
says, “Central to the concept of modernism in all the arts is the idea of 
collaboration—the notion that artist and audience conspire to create 
the work in its living form, that the experience of making it is in some 
way coterminous (if far from identical) to the experience of hearing, 
seeing, or reading it” (91). Since Rosenbaum means for something in 
this description to apply to the films of Altman and Rivette, we would 
now seem to be very far from Fried’s idea of cinema as a refuge from 
modernism. And yet—allowing that Rosenbaum appears to have in 
mind especially broad senses of “collaboration” and “experience of 
making,” ones not obviously touching on what would constitute the 
strict contents of the proceedings of, say, a play or a film—if we were 
to ask what might contrast with the circumstances Rosenbaum seems 
to be describing, we would likely arrive at something very much like 
Cavell’s description of cinema (in its relation to theater). That is, we 
would arrive at something comprising a limit on the audience’s agency, 
or their complicity in the constitution of the proceedings. In other 
words, the cinema would be our natural symbol for an escape from 
modernism. And this is not only because of the specific issues around 
cinema’s escape from theater’s fact of variability, but also because of 
the general attractions of thinking of modernism as informed by the 
continual need to re-open questions (about our grounds for getting 
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through to one another, thus maintaining a role for the other) with 
each new attempt to mean something, or with each new “performance.”
That sort of need typically elicits Cavell’s ambivalence: indeed, it 
is the occasion for the dilemma with which he concludes the first 
edition of The World Viewed. There Cavell notes something unsettling 
about film’s presentation of a world complete without me—it sug-
gests that the world does not need me, or could forget about me: “So 
there is reason for me to want the camera to deny the coherence of 
the world, its coherence as past” (WV 160). That wish again recalls 
Rosenbaum’s description of modernism, and the related idea of a 
world (or a work) as appealing to the need for my collaboration in 
it. On the other hand, Cavell says, “there is equal reason to want it 
affirmed that the world is coherent without me. That is essential to 
what I want of immortality: nature’s survival of me.” Though it might 
seem that Cavell finally settles on that last wish, a broader perspective 
makes the dilemma seem inexorable. After all, the idea of unending 
participation—of a continual need to re-open questions about how 
to get through to others—is connected to what Cavell once called 
in a much-quoted passage (there discussing the later Wittgenstein’s 
conception of language, and Wittgenstein’s undoing of expectations 
that the grounds of intelligibility are settled outside of exercises of 
human agency) a vision “as difficult as it is (because it is) terrifying” 
(MWM 52). It is crucial to Cavell’s understanding of cinema’s mythol-
ogy that it can provide a contrasting vision, one in which (even if 
only in a vision) the responsibility for projecting the world is “out of 
our hands” (WV 102). A question Cavell therefore leaves us with is 
whether that vision—of a world projected as already closed—has it 
own terrors, or whether it too is grace.
Part 2: Piñeiro’s Viola and Cinema’s Interrogation by Theater
2.1. But what is left of this mythology of cinema, in its relation to the-
ater, under contemporary conditions of digital viewing? Can any of it 
survive the undeniable prevalence of such phenomena as interactive 
digital media, viewer-generated content, real-time playback, and virtual 
reality? How seriously can we take the idea of contemporary cinema’s 
escaping variability—when it is definitional of “new media,” as Lev 
Manovich has put it, that its objects are “variable,” “mutable,” and 
“liquid” (36–45)?25 One reason why, in approaching these questions, 
25In the course of responding to some of Manovich’s formulations, Rodowick gives 
expression to the tension between something in this mythology and our ideas of digital 
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we should pay close attention to Matías Piñeiro’s recent work is that 
his films not only draw on this mythology (in ways that I will argue 
for in this part of the essay), but that their ways of doing so make it 
seem that that mythology is exactly necessitated by, and its recognition 
facilitated through, something in contemporary digital filmmaking.
Born in Buenos Aires in 1982 and now based in New York City, 
where he teaches at the Pratt Institute, Piñeiro is part of an extended 
generation of internationally recognized filmmakers who have studied 
at Argentina’s Universidad del Cine. He first rose to prominence with 
two 16mm features, The Stolen Man (2007) and the masterful They All 
Lie (2009), both concerned with young urbanites and their relations to 
the writings of the nineteenth-century Argentine statesman Domingo 
Faustino Sarmiento. With 2011’s short Rosalinda (about a rehearsal 
of As You Like It along the waters of the Delta del Tigre) he began 
the film series for which he is now best known, Las Shakespeariadas, 
which now includes four additional features that also take their titles 
from Shakespeare heroines: Viola (2012), The Princess of France (2014), 
Hermia & Helena (2016), and Isabella (2020). Featuring a fairly con-
sistent group of performers (particularly María Villar and Agustina 
Muñoz), all of the films in this series were shot in high-definition 
digital, and—resisting traditional notions of adaptation—all are con-
cerned with the production, rehearsal, and translation of Shakespeare 
in contemporary life.
My suggestion, then, is that something in Piñeiro’s turn to cinema’s 
relations with theater in his Shakespeare films since 2011 has been 
brought about by the character of digital filmmaking. And we can 
perhaps already imagine some ways in which such a thought might 
go, at least when it comes to the facilitating powers of digital cinema. 
For example, if, as I suggested above, showing multiple takes of the 
same scene can be a film’s way of declaring the medium’s relations to 
theater (as in the opening of Godard’s King Lear), then the availability 
of such means (if this were to come up in editing) is greatly multiplied 
to the extent that digital cinematography liberates a filmmaker from a 
limited supply of analog film stock (and thus from a limited number 
cinema when he says, “Before the digital screen, we do not feel powerless, but rather 
express a will to control information and to shape ourselves and the world through the 
medium of information” (174). Previous treatments of digital cinema as a purported 
problem for Cavell have tended to focus on whether his supposed “photographic real-
ism” can survive the emergence of computer-generated imagery (CGI) and digital-image 
processing (Prince, “True Lies” 29–30); I think the above problems surrounding vari-
ability are no less significant for grappling with the contemporary interest of Cavell’s 
“ontology of film.”
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of takes).26 And yet what I think is even more central to Piñeiro’s films 
is a particular idea of cinema’s medium specificity (in its relation to 
theater), articulated through the questions of contemporary digital 
filmmaking, and an idea that makes perfect sense after an accounting 
of Cavell’s and Fried’s views on what it is for cinema to escape theater. 
That is, at yet another historical juncture marked by questions about 
what cinema is, relating the medium to theater serves a double func-
tion. Obviously, this includes the function of reminding us of features 
of cinema’s specificity in comparison with another medium; but it 
also includes the function of relieving us of the urgency of questions 
about its specificity by relating it to that very medium (namely, the 
theater in its character as a symbol of what urges such questions on 
us—to return to Fried’s image, as elaborated by Cavell) for which the 
cinema figures as a symbol of refuge or escape.
If we can find something along the lines of those thoughts in Viola 
(and I have already noted an interesting proximity between those 
thoughts and Piñeiro’s articulation of his experience of Rivette’s 
films), then Piñeiro, with his particular way of filming theater (under 
conditions of digital viewing), may have arrived at, or played a role 
in constituting, an “automatism” in Cavell’s developed sense. Cavell 
famously argues that the term “automatism” not only has application 
to film’s manufacturing or material basis, and not only to the notion 
of the material basis of an artistic medium as such, but also, most 
importantly, that it is a term appropriate for organizing the various 
ways of getting through to another, and of going on, within any art: 
including “forms,” “genres,” “modes of achievement,” “artistic dis-
coveries,” and of course the “medium” (WV 32, 101–08; cf. Trahair 
138). Thus, for Cavell, the task of the modernist artist is not just to 
produce a new instance of a medium, but to produce a new way of 
going on, or a new automatism, within or out of that medium (WV 
103). That Cavell’s developed sense of “automatism” is especially 
conducive to thinking about digital cinema—that it can allow us to 
understand certain continuities between digital and analog cinema, 
despite their distinct phenomenologies and material bases, but also 
that our interest in digital cinema rests on its character as a field for 
generating new automatisms—is a proposal closely associated with 
26Manovich has discussed how roughly similar narrative strategies reflect the database 
logic (involving the preservation, classification, and retrieval of multiple variations) 
characteristic of “new media” (237–43). Piñeiro has himself talked about how working 
in digital has resulted in a proliferation of takes in his recent films, in contrast with his 
two earlier features shot in 16mm (“Kazik Radwanski and Matías Piñeiro”).
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D.N. Rodowick’s 2007 book The Virtual Life of Film. My understanding 
of Piñeiro’s relation to automatism depends on Rodowick’s proposal 
but is also (non-trivially) more specific: that Piñeiro (though likely 
not Piñeiro alone) has tapped the potential, or the “automatism,” in 
digital cinema for filming theater in order to raise, and then deflate, 
questions about cinema’s specificity.
Fully assessing this claim would require taking into account the 
extent to which this automatism can be carried on, or can generate 
new instances, beyond Viola or any of Piñeiro’s particular works. Thus, 
Cavell speaks of “automatism” in part to convey the idea of a medium’s 
producing or calling for new instances, something he connects to the 
phenomenon of “series” in the plastic arts (WV 103, 107).27 And here 
we should pay attention to Piñeiro’s own creation of a series across the 
last decade, and that it is characteristic of the films following Viola in 
his Shakespeare series to bring into consideration, relative to both 
theater and digital cinema, an even wider variety of media (such as oil 
painting and classical music in The Princess of France, analog found foot-
age in Hermia & Helena, and installation art in Isabella). Perhaps most 
significantly, an understanding of this automatism would also allow us 
to understand its apparent operation, in the recurrence of the figure 
of theater in digital films across the last decade, among that genera-
tion (born between the mid-1970s and early 1980s) of Argentine and 
Argentina-based filmmakers, most of them having worked in Buenos 
Aires theater, with whom Piñeiro shares circles of collaboration and 
influence.28 That would have to be part of a broader story, but I think 
27This aspect of “automatism,” and especially our reticence to call something a 
medium if it is, or could only be, unique to one artist, is emphasized by Costello, 
“Automat” 844–49.
28That would likely include the use of theater’s characteristic repetitions-with-variations 
across performances, in this case as a site for remembering and working through war 
trauma, in Theatre of War (2018) by Lola Arias (born in 1976), also part of an extended 
theatrical and video-installation project; as well as the use of home-made theater and 
make-believe, mixed with electronic screens, in the creation of a peculiar domestic space 
in So Long Enthusiasm (2017) by the Argentina-based Colombian director Vladimir Durán 
(born in 1977). It would clearly have to include Piñeiro’s close collaborator, and editor 
of Viola, Alejo Moguillansky (born in 1978), who in the last decade has produced his 
own series of films concerned with the special difficulties of filming opera, ballet, and 
contemporary theater. This has culminated in Moguillansky’s own suggestions about me-
dium specificity—through juxtaposing the staging of an opera by Helmut Lachenmann 
with a child’s repeated viewings of a DVD of Bresson’s Au Hasard Balthazar (1966) and 
entertaining the roots of all arts in the dreams and games of childhood—in The Little 
Match Girl (2017). Finally, Mariano Llinás’s (born in 1975) landmark fourteen-hour 
La Flor (2018), which began filming in 2009, could be interpreted as this generation’s 
summary statement of its discoveries during this period. Though this film’s explicit 
treatment of theater (in its fourth episode, during a presentation of a legend involving 
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that a thorough consideration of Viola (which, from 2012, would lie 
comparatively early in Piñeiro’s process of forming an “automatism” 
during this period) could provide a basis for approaching it. Since 
good accounts of the opening scenes of Viola already exist,29 I will 
briefly summarize those scenes before going on to give a more detailed 
account of what takes place after the belated-seeming introduction of 
the character named Viola (María Villar): an entrance that brings to 
the forefront cinema’s condition as an automatic medium, and thus 
its capacity for escaping theater’s fact of variability, through Piñeiro’s 
staging an “interrogation” of one medium by the other.
2.2. The first third of Viola’s brisk hourlong running time concerns a 
real-life play, in fact a medley of seven Shakespeare plays, that Piñeiro 
arranged and directed in Buenos Aires in 2011, And When I Love Thee 
Not, Chaos is Come Again (Y cuando no te quiera, será de nuevo el caos). 
The film opens with an actress (Sabrina, played by Elisa Carricajo) 
backstage before a performance, breaking up with her boyfriend 
Agustín by phone. We then see her in the play itself, in the role of 
Twelfth Night’s Olivia, speaking the dialogue from that play in which 
Viola, impersonating the messenger Cesario, attempts to cajole Olivia’s 
love for Cesario’s master, Orsino, only here Cesario is called “Bassanio,” 
Orsino is called “Antonio,” and the dialogue is mixed with lines from 
The Merchant of Venice. (Indeed the first lines of the play we hear are 
Olivia speaking as Shylock: “I have sworn an oath that I will have my 
bond.”) Throughout Sabrina is being watched from the audience by 
Agustín (Alessio Rigo de Righi), just as the actress playing Viola, Cecilia 
(Agustina Muñoz), is herself being watched by a stranger (Esteban 
Biliardi), whose stares she returns. In their dressing-room conversation 
following the performance, the play’s four actresses focus on their 
experience with this sort of communication between stage and audi-
ence (and its characteristic anxieties, familiar from Cavell’s writing), 
as well as Sabrina’s reasons for leaving Agustín (related to her avowed 
habit in winters of “loving ‘less,’ of doing ‘less’”). After Sabrina departs 
the dressing room, Cecilia hatches a scheme (expressed, fantastically, 
in highly rehearsed rhyming couplets) according to which she will 
Casanova) is very brief, its sharing its principal cast with the theater group Piel de Lava 
(and its extended cast with regular actors in Piñeiro’s and Moguillansky’s films) makes 
theater throughout as much an issue as, and intertwined with, its own explorations 
of cinema’s oldest mythologies. (This includes its opening by linking the powers of 
cinema with the powers of mummification, recalling Bazin 9, 14–15, and its closing by 
digitally reproducing the results of a camera obscura).
29See Ceresa as well as Garrison and Berg, though the below discussion will reveal 
differences in interpretation from both those commentaries.
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somehow convince Sabrina of the self-centeredness of her conception 
of love—and of the correctness of her supposedly competing “theory” 
that love “depends on the other”—by herself seducing Sabrina. This 
is what then takes place in Sabrina’s home, as they rehearse the same 
dialogue from the play we had earlier heard, with Cecilia flirtatiously 
looping the dialogue back as Sabrina attempts to press on, culminat-
ing in Cecilia’s receiving Sabrina’s kiss.
Already in these early scenes we see a variety of conceptions of 
theater at play, including that of theater as seasonal ritual (related 
to Twelfth Night, written for the period of winter feasts) and even 
seasonal purge (as in Sabrina’s description of her winter habits). 
It also includes “theater” in the pejorative sense of the scripted or 
forced (as in the actresses’ forced construal of Cecilia’s expression 
of personal sensibility in terms of a “theory” of love, resulting in the 
incredible suggestion that Cecilia could communicate that theory 
to Sabrina by seducing her). And it prominently includes questions 
of make-believe (as in questions of what, if not the actresses’ games of 
make-believe—perhaps recalling Céline and Julie Go Boating—might be 
controlling features of the film’s narration, in order to account for 
such fantastic elements as Cecilia’s breaking into rhyming couplets). 
But most importantly, these scenes also declare phenomena we have 
seen to be connected to theater’s fact of variability, as well as what 
happens when those phenomena are put on film. These include how 
the confusing piling-on of roles within the play (Carricajo at once 
playing Sabrina, Olivia, and Shylock; Muñoz at once playing Cecilia, 
Viola, Cesario, and Bassanio) mainly results in our paying attention 
to just these individuals (whatever roles they may occupy). This then 
serves to declare something along the lines of Cavell’s idea of theater’s 
relative dependence on transpersonal and trans-temporal roles and 
the cinema’s relative dependence on particular actors (or particular 
performances; cf. Gómez and Cruz 39, 88). Similarly, in the seduction-
by-rehearsal between Cecilia and Sabrina, we see a demonstration 
of film’s capacity to represent a rehearsal as a rehearsal—including, 
in its repetitions, as a possible site for erotic jesting—as opposed to 
what, in a live performance, we might see (or we might be guided by 
theater’s conventions to see) as nothing other than the manifestation 
(and occasional breaking) of the actors’ roles.
The film then moves to an even closer attention to questions of 
automatic and digital reproducibility, as from Sabrina’s kissing Cecilia 
it cuts to box with a red “M” stamped on it, at some level evoking the 
“M” of Fritz Lang’s 1931 film. We hear a man (Alberto Ajaka) describ-
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ing what seems to be the very scene (of a kiss) we have just witnessed, 
at first suggesting a framing device (Garrison and Berg 238). But in 
fact he turns out to be telling an unrelated fictional story to Viola, 
who is making deliveries for “Metropolis” (evoking yet another Lang 
film, indeed one whose long-missing scenes were discovered in Buenos 
Aires in 2008), the bootleg CD and DVD business she shares with her 
boyfriend, Javier.30 From this man’s house Viola travels by bicycle to 
two more clients, as the film focuses on the logistics of delivery and 
of Viola’s collecting debts and payments, until she arrives at Sabrina’s 
apartment at evidently just the moment of her kiss with Cecilia. Since 
her delivery is for Agustín and Sabrina does not have enough to pay 
her, Viola then travels to Agustín’s apartment, where, curiously, she 
outside encounters Cecilia (again, the actress playing Shakespeare’s 
Viola in the play-wthin-the-film). They both wait for Agustín in Cecilia’s 
car, where Viola finds the red-plastic ring used as a prop in the play 
(which Cecilia lets her keep), and after avowing her distance from 
theater-acting by saying she could never learn lines, she places her 
head on the car’s headrest.
The remarkable scene that follows is an unbroken long-take shot 
within the car, whose fogged windows create the effect of a hermetic 
seal or a dream-screen. In the distance Cecilia and Viola recognize 
a mutual friend, Ruth (Romina Paula), whom they invite inside to 
escape the wet cold. We learn that Ruth will replace Cecilia in her 
role in the play, and so in order to pass the time they begin rehearsing 
lines we have not yet heard in this film, from Rosalind’s epilogue to As 
You Like It. Viola interrupts by saying that she too knows this epilogue 
(despite her earlier insistence that she cannot learn lines), which she 
then recites nearly perfectly. This sufficiently impresses Cecilia and 
Ruth that they suggest that Viola herself replace Ruth once her time 
is up in this role. The camera has still not left its closeup on Viola’s 
face when the two theater actresses, having offered her a role, abruptly 
begin a harsh interrogation of her. “Everything works out pretty easy 
for you,” Ruth says. “You’re quite passive and yet many things happen 
to you.” Cecilia agrees: “You react.” “That’s horrible,” Viola objects. As 
though this were the same issue as Viola’s supposed “passivity,” Ruth 
asks about her routine with Javier: for example, whether upon arriving 
home she immediately kisses him, to which Viola nods. “Always the 
same thing? . . . You see, completely automated,” a phrase that Cecilia 
30Piñeiro’s main purpose was to base this on a real-life business called “Alphaville,” 
after Godard’s own “futuristic” city (Titze). The idea of juxtaposing rehearsals of Shake-
speare with references to Metropolis also links Viola to Rivette’s Paris Belongs to Us (1961).
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repeats. In order to “stop doing what you always do” (as Ruth puts it) 
or to “de-automate yourself” (as Cecilia puts it), they suggest to Viola 
that she do nothing when Javier returns that day and wait to see if, in 
the best case, he goes around and suddenly kisses her: “That would 
mean that you can still save the relationship,” Cecilia says.
 Therefore, in a scene that had just drawn attention to the fact 
of variability in theater (through the possibility of many performers 
occupying the same role), two theater actresses criticize a woman 
identified with the cinema (thanks at least to her delivery of bootleg 
DVDs, though I will soon say more about this allegorical identifica-
tion) for being “automated,” for always doing the same thing. It is 
as though an escape from theater’s imposition of variability were 
something that generated its own problems and questions (such as 
those surrounding the foreclosing—to a film declared finished—of a 
“new beginning” like that available to a new performance of a play). 
The scene comes to an end when Ruth spots someone named “Geró-
nimo” outside, opening the door not onto the street outside Agustín’s 
apartment but (surreally) onto the very windy waters of the Río de 
la Plata—upon which Viola wakes, revealing everything in this long 
take to have been a dream.
The rest of the film concerns the fate of Viola’s relationship with 
Javier, and terminates in the melancholic presentation of their singing 
a song together that I mentioned above. We learn that Javier is indeed 
the same member of the audience who had been staring at Cecilia 
during the play’s performance. When he enters their apartment, Viola, 
now wearing the red-plastic ring that Cecilia had given her, is absorbed 
in listening to music on headphones—in fact, the same contemporary 
music that had been playing in Cecilia’s car—thus raising the question 
of what Viola has inherited from Cecilia, and from theater-acting more 
generally. Following the actresses’ advice in her dream, she declines 
to give Javier her “automated” kiss, leaving him somewhat nonplussed. 
Javier then hands Viola the potatoes that, we come to see, she uses to 
make the red “M” impressed on the business’s packages (thus identify-
ing Viola, not just with the cinema, including its digital manifestations, 
but also with the most ancient kind of automatic reproducibility). In 
the background a film faintly recognizable as Fritz Lang’s Fury (1936) 
is playing on a laptop. (“Tomorrow’s order,” she says.)
It is in this context—of comings and goings in a young couple’s 
apartment, of evident accidents made permanent (such as someone 
unaffiliated with the film knocking on the apartment’s door)—that 
Javier comes up to Viola in order to kiss her, thus fulfilling what Ceci-
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lia (in Viola’s dream) had said was the only sign that their relation-
ship could have a future. And it is in this moment that Viola speaks 
in voiceover, describing how (despite Javier’s kiss) the relationship 
would not last, and that Javier would gradually leave her for Cecilia. 
Having heard these melancholic words read over a closeup of Viola 
continuing to make the “M” stamps, we then see her in the apartment’s 
“rehearsal room” sharing a song with Javier. This scene’s improvisation 
obviously links it with the other performances (both rehearsed and 
improvised) that we have seen in this film, as its seemingly nonsensi-
cal lyrics relate to the questions of debt and credit that have been 
central since the first utterance of lines from The Merchant of Venice: 
Viola sings, “Bring me back my six hundred bucks” as, indeed, the 
closing credits begin to roll.
2.3. I have already noted something, beginning with Viola’s deliv-
ering DVDs for “Metropolis,” of her symbolic identification with the 
cinema (as well as other forms of technological reproducibility), 
including her self-characterization (via the actresses in her dream) as 
reactive, which might furthermore recall the camera in its automatic 
character (cf. WV 184, 185).31 In addition, it could perhaps allay the 
worst impressions about this kind of identification (that it would 
have to be somehow objectifying or de-humanizing) to note that it 
also appears connected to Viola’s capacity, special among the film’s 
characters, for bringing proceedings to an end. This is manifested in 
her special command of epilogues, both in her oneiric memory of 
Rosalind’s epilogue in As You Like It and her own voiceover narration, 
closing the film itself, and thus recalling what Cavell says (in discussing 
cinema’s escaping theater’s fact of variability) about how a filmmaker 
can call a work finished with relatively decisive consequences for its 
future projections, in contrast with future performances of a play.
That voiceover narration is particularly significant for how it forces 
a complete rethinking of the film’s earlier proceedings, an idea that 
Garrison and Berg gesture at when they say that it reveals that “the 
entire movie has been a flashback” (241). But this would be a pecu-
liar kind of flashback, since the character from whose point of view 
it has been so revealed does not herself appear in the film’s earliest 
extended scenes (centered around the theater performance and the 
seduction-by-rehearsal). What the voiceover narration then raises is 
the possibility that these early scenes are also to be understood as from 
Viola’s point of view, and therefore that, within the film, Viola’s dream 
31This identification with cinema is developed so consistently that it might not be too 
outrageous to note Viola’s name’s rhyming with moviola, the analog film editing machine.
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is not the only presentation of her fantasies—among which we could 
perhaps include her fantasized reconstructions of the events leading 
up to the end of her relationship with Javier.32
In fact, those early scenes are strictly constituted by material we 
know to be accessible to Viola’s consciousness, either in those scenes 
with her that we do see, or in what, as in her visit to the theater with 
Javier, where she will introduce him to Cecilia, we know from her 
voiceover to follow the film’s explicit proceedings. And though this 
interpretation is hardly forced by those scenes’ fantastic elements, like 
Cecilia’s speaking in rhyming couplets, it does help us to understand 
something of the initially deceptive framing involved in the first cli-
ent’s telling Viola a story about a kiss. This not only helps to smooth 
the transition from Sabrina’s kissing Cecilia to Viola’s story, but also 
raises the general question of framing with respect to these earlier 
scenes, and whether, despite this local deception, they indeed might 
be fictions-within-a-fiction—that is, Viola’s fantasies.
If we can understand Viola as allegorizing cinema in its automatic 
character, and the film itself as at least raising the question of whether 
its entirety can be interpreted as from her point of view, then we 
are better prepared for the idea that Viola is a surrogate for the 
film’s director (cf. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness 66, 107–08; Wilson, 
Narration in Light 138–39). This is something additionally brought 
out by Piñeiro’s peculiar kind of presence in those scenes in which 
Viola does not appear, which all happen to be concerned with the 
performance and rehearsal of a real play that Piñeiro arranged and 
directed: it is as though only one or the other (taking into account a 
director’s peculiar kind of presence in their own play; cf. WV 229–30) 
must always be present in every scene. The importance of Piñeiro’s 
having a surrogate in this film then emerges through questions about 
how Viola’s relations to the theater (such as her interrogation by the 
theater actresses in her dream, and her clearly owing something to 
them, symbolized in her having their shared ring bestowed on her) 
are expressions of Piñeiro’s own anxieties—having for the first time, 
just before this film, arranged and directed a theater play—about what 
he owes to the theater. (Understanding this as acknowledging a debt 
not only calls to mind the film’s economic themes, arising from its 
use of lines from The Merchant of Venice, but also that the film’s final 
32Thus, this voiceover at least raises the question of whether Viola is an instance of 
what Wilson calls “epistemological twist films,” which are “defined by the fact that global 
aspects of the epistemic structure of their narration are clarified, in a surprising way, 
only toward the end of the movie” (Seeing Fictions 156).
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acknowledgement of live performance, manifested in Viola’s shared 
song with Javier, occurs during its final credits, as though performance 
more than anything is what demands crediting.)
Therefore, this interpretation of Viola gets us as far as seeing how 
Piñeiro’s concerns about his debt to theater join together with what I 
have proposed as one component of his “automatism” in digital film-
making: namely, the addressing of questions about cinema’s specificity 
(under contemporary conditions of digital viewing) by reminding 
us of that medium’s relations to theater (including its escape from 
theater’s fact of variability). But since considering Piñeiro’s account 
of Rivette’s films, and of course also Fried’s and Cavell’s conceptions 
of cinema’s relations to theater, I have been just as interested in the 
possibility of a second component of that automatism, one through 
which examining those same relations also provides us with an image 
of escape from our anxieties about medium specificity. And that image 
of escape is no less manifest in Viola, despite being highly condensed 
in the film’s closing moments. That is, Viola’s shared song with Javier 
is not just a happy moment irretrievably lost, but also constitutes, in 
a film marked by concerns (even up to the end of this song) about 
cinema’s debt to theater, a sign that those sorts of anxieties can, how-
ever momentarily, be set aside; and, moreover, a sign that depends 
exactly on our understanding of cinema as the appropriate medium 
for providing that kind of relief. After all, the very last words heard 
in this film—at the end of the closing credits—are also the very last 
words sung by Viola (the film’s symbol of the medium of cinema, in 
its relation to theater, as well as the filmmaker’s surrogate): “I will 
forget you.”33
33I thank the audiences and co-panelists at three presentations I gave of an earlier 
version of this essay in 2019: the “Thought of Movies” colloquium at the Université Paris 
I - Panthéon Sorbonne (organized by Elise Domenach and Sandra Laugier), a panel 
on aesthetics at the V Congreso Iberoamericano de Filosofía (held at UNAM’s Faculty 
of Philosophy and Letters), and the “Constellations of the Ordinary” colloquium at the 
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (organized by Victor Krebs). I also received 
feedback from Paloma Atencia Linares, Anke Breunig, Dan Morgan, Paul Schofield, 
Deniz Tortum, and especially an anonymous reviewer for MLN, whose recommenda-
tions truly helped me to bring the essay together. For specific comments following 
the aforementioned presentations, I want to thank Steve Affeldt, Avner Baz, Gordon 
Bearn, Alice Crary, David LaRocca, Christian Martin, Richard Moran, Jean-Philippe 
Narboux, Gustavo Ortiz Millán, Karel Pletnick, Kate Rennebohm, and David Rodowick. 
My thoughts on the possible connection between Piñeiro’s Viola and Cavell’s way of 
concluding “More of The World Viewed” date way back to a 2013 conversation with Piñeiro 
following a screening of that film at Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts. Patricia Marechal, 
who told me about the screening (and who had earlier introduced me to Lola Arias’s 
work, mentioned above), was also an important part of that conversation. I was able 
to work through my understanding of Piñeiro’s films in an email correspondence in 
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